Category: First Amendment

In Cambridge, a dubious balancing act

I have not yet read the report of the Cambridge Review Committee, which investigated last July’s arrest of Harvard University scholar Henry Louis Gates Jr. But unless someone tells me otherwise, I’m not sure I need to — the bottom line is enough.

According to news accounts, the committee found that both Gates and Sgt. James Crowley, the arresting officer, were to blame, and that each man missed opportunities to “de-escalate” the situation, which ended when Gates was arrested on disorderly-conduct charges. Those charges were quickly dismissed.

The only thing that strikes me as worth saying — again — is that Gates clearly lost it that day. But he was standing in his own home, believing (probably falsely) that he was the victim of racial profiling. Crowley had a badge, a gun and the certain knowledge that Gates was the resident, not an intruder.

Both men are not to blame. Crowley should have left.

Martin Finucane of the Boston Globe covers the story here, and Laura Crimaldi of the Boston Herald catches up with Gates’ lawyer, Harvard Law school professor Charles Ogletree.

Earlier coverage.

“Contempt of cop” and the Gates case

When Harvard scholar Henry Louis Gates was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct inside his own home in Cambridge last July, the incident struck many of us as being less about race than about the right of someone who had done nothing wrong to mouth off to a police officer.

Now comes the New England Center for Investigative Reporting, which has a story in today’s Boston Globe showing that what happened to Gates was part of a pattern in Cambridge. Though the center found no evidence of racial profiling, it did find that the majority of people charged with disorderly conduct from 2004 to ’09 were arrested because of something they said. A key excerpt:

The most striking conclusion of the review of Cambridge police data is that the majority of those arrested for disorderly conduct were allegedly yelling, often screaming obscenities, in front of police before the handcuffs snapped shut. More than 60 percent of the disorderly arrests reviewed by center involved some sort of allegedly inflammatory speech, such as talking back to the police, more commonly known as “contempt of cop.’’

Gates, as you recall, was arrested by Sgt. James Crowley, who had been dispatched to Gates’ home following a report that two men had been seen trying to force their way in. (Gates and his taxi driver had forced open a stuck door.) Gates, apparently believing he’d been racially profiled, exchanged words with Crowley, though the two disagree over exactly what was said.

We’re still waiting to hear why Crowley wrote in his report that a witness told him at the scene that two black men were observed trying to get in. The woman later said she made no mention of race when she called the police station, and that she never spoke directly with Crowley, as he claimed. Perhaps that will be explained in a report by a city task force, which, according to the Cambridge Chronicle, could be released any day now.

Keeping public records public

In 1989, Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, ruled that public records can cease to be public once they’ve been compiled into a computerized, easy-to-access database.

Now the Court is hearing a case with some eerie similarities involving the names of people who sign petitions to place public-policy questions on the ballot. In the Guardian this week, I compare the two cases — and hope that Stevens, as one of his final acts before retiring this summer, will help keep public records public.

ACLU attorney Wunsch on the anti-SLAPP ruling

Sarah Wunsch, staff attorney for the ACLU of Massachusetts, e-mailed her thoughts on the state Supreme Judicial Court’s ruling that journalists are not protected by a state law prohibiting “strategic lawsuits against public participation” — also known as the anti-SLAPP statute. The Associated Press covers the ruling here. Background here. Below is Wunsch’s e-mail, presented in its entirety.

Despite our amicus brief urging otherwise, the SJC has affirmed Judge Hines’s Superior Court denial of the special motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute that had been filed by the journalist, Hollander, after she was sued by the developer, Fustolo. The unanimous opinion is written by Justice Botsford. Her opinion focuses on the fact that Hollander was not seeking to redress a grievance or to petition for relief of her own. She says, “As in Kobrin, the defendant’s conduct was not an attempt to redress a wrong he suffered, nor was he petitioning on his own behalf.”

Although the opinion says that a person is protected only if personally seeking redress of a grievance of his or her own, Justice Botsford distinguishes a case in which an attorney was given protection under the anti-SLAPP statute for his statements on behalf of his clients, and not for himself. To do that, she asserts that reporters occupy a different position with respect to a petitioning party than does the party’s attorney.

“There is nothing about the role or function of a staff reporter of an independent newspaper that by its nature renders the reporter a representative or agent of every, or indeed any, community organization that the reporter may cover,” particularly where the reporter denies representing a particular viewpoint. She contrasts this with Baker v. Parsons, where a biologist employed by an organization testified about her views and was protected by the SLAPP statute. (This reasoning seems to leave out of the equation whether the media outlet itself is the “petitioning party.” She seems to assume that it is only the community-based advocacy groups whose views the journalist is promoting.)

Thus, one of our concerns, that employees of advocacy organizations would not be protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, appears alleviated. Even if you are working for someone else as an advocate, as long as it is clear you are advocating for something, you should be protected.

Justice Botsford does reject the concept in Judge Hines’ opinion that because Hollander was paid, she had a private reason for her reporting, and was not sued for her petitioning alone. Being paid does not take a person out of the SLAPP protection.

Finally, Justice Botsford disagrees that this ruling will chill journalists. She cites New York Times v. Sullivan and the protection for reporters under that and under the fair-report doctrine.

As I read the opinion, a reporter writing news stories that are supposedly “objective” will not be protected by the SLAPP statute, despite the very broad definition of petitioning activity. If an editor or publisher wants to stir up the public to get them to support government action by focusing a series of news articles on the subject, too bad. No anti-SLAPP statute protection seemingly for the journalist despite the fact that the definition of petitioning includes this. I do not think this result is correct.

Under the Botsford decision, an opinion columnist is likely going to be protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, as is an employee of an advocacy organization. It seems that the concept of objective fair news reporting operates here to deprive news reporters of anti-SLAPP statute protection. One question is whether the newspaper publisher will be protected. The Botsford opinion talks about advocacy organizations but doesn’t seem to recognize that news media organizations can be advocacy organizations or be the “petitioning party” itself, engaged in activity that meets the definition of petitioning under the statute.

SJC rules against journalist-activist

Adam Gaffin has already posted some details on the state Supreme Judicial Court’s ruling earlier today against Fredda Holland, a journalist who claimed that a libel suit filed against her should be dismissed on the grounds that it was aimed at putting a halt to her community activism. Gaffin has posted the full decision as well.

Hollander, a former reporter for the Regional Review, had been active in a neighborhood association along with her husband, Bill Lee. She had used her platform at the Review to oppose plans by a North End developer named Steven Fustolo. When Fustolo sued her for libel, Hollander’s lawyer, Harvey Shapiro, argued that she should be protected by the state’s anti-SLAPP law, an acronym that means “strategic lawsuit against public participation.”

For background, click here. Disclosure: I was paid to write an affidavit (pdf) on Hollander’s behalf at an earlier stage of the case.

J.D. Salinger’s battle against free expression

J.D. Salinger, who died Wednesday at the age of 91, spent the last year of his life waging a wrong-headed battle against the fair-use exemption to copyright law, which allows for the use of copyrighted materials without permission under certain limited circumstances.

A Swedish humorist who goes by the name of J.D. California wrote a sequel to Salinger’s most famous work, “The Catcher in the Rye,” called “60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye.” Salinger sued for copyright violation, even though parody is protected by fair use.

Last summer I gave Salinger a Boston Phoenix Muzzle Award for this outrage against free speech. I am, of course, under no illusions that Salinger ever knew or cared. What’s more disturbing is that the courts held up publication of “60 Years Later,” and that the case is still pending.

Let’s hope Salinger’s heirs drop the suit.

Good for speech, bad for democracy?

My heart is telling me one thing and my head another following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to remove political-speech restrictions on corporations and, by implication, labor unions.

On the one hand, I had been looking forward to this. I am close to being a First Amendment absolutist, and I gag instinctively at the idea that any form of political speech should be restricted, theories about corporate personhood aside.

On the other hand, we know what’s going to happen, don’t we? It’s bad enough that Congress can’t get health care right thanks to the doleful effects of corporate lobbying. And I do wonder why the Court had to overturn restrictions on corporations that extended back a century.

For the time being, I’m going to punt, and link to an article I wrote for the Boston Phoenix in 2003 on a corporate-speech case involving Nike.

An important libel ruling by the SJC

The state’s Supreme Judicial Court issued an important decision today that reaffirms protections for the news media against libel suits.

The case involved a town employee in Abington who was fired after sexually explicit images were discovered on his town-owned computer. The Enterprise of Brockton published a series of stories on official actions taken against the employee (who was eventually fired), based almost entirely on anonymous sources.

The SJC decision, written by Justice Robert Cordy, found that the fair-report privilege, which allows journalists to report libelous statements made in the course of official proceedings, applies even when those reports are based on anonymous sources.

Cordy also ruled that the Enterprise’s stories were substantially fair and accurate despite an error in one of the stories, and that the ex-employee could not sue the paper for intentionally inflicting emotional distress.

Those are the highlights. First Amendment lawyer Robert Ambrogi offers a deeper analysis here. The full text of the decision is here. (Via Universal Hub.)